University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2003

Returning to the Roots of Environmental Justice:
Lessons from the Inequitable Distribution of
Municipal Services
Sten-Erik Hoidal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Hoidal, Sten-Erik, "Returning to the Roots of Environmental Justice: Lessons from the Inequitable Distribution of Municipal Services"
(2003). Minnesota Law Review. 705.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/705

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Note
Returning to the Roots of Environmental Justice:
Lessons from the Inequitable Distribution
of Municipal Services
Sten-Erik Hoidal*
Race is the most significant variable associated with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities.' Indeed, a
strong statistical correlation exists between the number of hazardous waste facilities and the size of the proximate minority
population.2 Further, three out of five Hispanic- and AfricanAmericans live in communities with uncontrolled toxic waste
sites.' Regarding enforcement, penalties under hazardous
waste laws in areas with the greatest white population are
nearly 500% higher than those in areas with the greatest minority population.4 While such disparities are shocking, the environmental justice movement made significant strides toward
their alleviation-that is, until recently.
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1999, The
Colorado College. I wish to thank Professor Kevin Washburn for his insightfulness
and dedication to students. Additionally, I am indebted to Editors and Staff of the
Minnesota Law Review for their tireless efforts. This article is dedicated to my family, John, Judy, Mari, and Anikka, for their constant support, love, and guidance;
and, finally, to June, for everything.
1. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES, at xiii (1987). This is the seminal
study on environmental justice and serves as the basis for all subsequent environmental justice studies. See ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE,
CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, at xiv (1990) (describing the United
Church of Christ Commission study as a landmark and presenting several
studies which corroborate the findings of the above study); see also Vicki Been,
What's Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1993) (highlighting several local studies that confirm minority representation is disproportionately large near hazardous waste sites).
2. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, supra
note 1, at 18.
3. Id. at xiv.
4. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial
Divide in Environmental Law, NATL L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2.
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In 2001, the environmental justice movement ground to a
halt. The Supreme Court and the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals acted concurrently to eliminate the most promising
avenues through which minority communities could contest
perceived threats to their urban environment. In Alexander v.
Sandoval,5 the Supreme Court held that citizens could not sue
directly to compel compliance with regulations designed to
remedy disparate impact discrimination in federally funded
programs.' In South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (Camden III),7 the

Third Circuit extended the Supreme Court's reasoning to hold
that no private right of action existed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for citizens to enforce section 602 disparate impact regulations.8
This result created a bewildered environmental justice movement in need of a new legal medium through which to pursue
its claims.
Seeking a sympathetic forum in which to voice its concern
is not a new situation for the environmental justice movement. 9
Historically, the legal strategies employed by the environmental justice movement have met with limited success.lO

5. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
6. Id. at 293. Such regulations are promulgated under section 602 of
Title VI. This section states:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of
grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section
2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing
rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is
taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless
and until approved by the President.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000). This statute has been interpreted to allow governmental agencies to promulgate disparate impact regulations. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1983). For a more
complete discussion of section 602 of Title VI, see infra Part II.D.
7. 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Camden III].
8. Id. at 774.
9. Brendan Cody, Note, South Camden Citizens in Action: Siting Decisions, DisparateImpact Discrimination,and Section 1983, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q.
231, 232 (2002) ("For more than a decade, advocates of environmental justice
have sought sympathetic fora in which to pursue their concerns.").
10. See Paul Maynard Hendrick, The Theory of Legal Relativity: Environmental Justice in the Context of Doctrinal Durability, 32 U. TOL. L. REV.
137, 158 (2001) ("Environmental justice advocates acknowledge that the doc-
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There is, however, one exception. During the 1970s and 1980s,
several minority communities successfully challenged inequitable distribution of municipal services on equal protection
grounds." These suits sought to rectify what the communities
perceived as differential treatment of minority and nonminority
communities by municipal governments. Their success
stemmed from the use of statistical disparities and historical
evidence of discrimination to demonstrate the municipalities'
intents to discriminate.1 2 Despite these early successes, the environmental justice movement has not attempted to revive
these cases in a modern context. Given the results in Sandoval
and Camden III, it should.
This Note argues that analogizing to the municipal services equalization cases would provide environmental justice
advocates with a new framework in which to assert successful
equal protection claims. In addition, structuring environmental
justice claims in accordance with these cases would allow the
movement to take advantage of their precedential authority.
Part I gives a brief overview of the history of the environmental
justice movement. Part II details the legal avenues frequented
by the environmental justice movement. Part III explores the
reasons for success in the municipal services cases. Finally,
Part IV analogizes environmental justice suits to these cases
and explores the pros and cons of modeling environmental justice suits after the municipal services cases.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
The term "environmental justice" is perpetually evolving
and has no settled meaning. 3 Thus, the most recent attempt to
define environmental justice will have to suffice. Former Envitrine has not overcome the remedial limitations of constitutional law, environmental law, civil rights law, administrative law, tort law, and property
law.").
11. See Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 987-89 (11th Cir. 1986);
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1184-87 (11th Cir. 1983); Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (5th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. City of
Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1376-79 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
12. See Ammons, 783 F.2d at 987-89; Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1184-87; Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1291-92; Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1376-79.
13. See Tseming Yang, The Form and Substance of Environmental Justice: The Challenge of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for Environmental
Regulation, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 143, 158-62 (2002) (discussing the
variable contours of the term "environmental justice").
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ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator Christine
Todd Whitman described environmental justice as "when everyone, regardless of race, color, or income, enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and
equal access to the decision-making process."'4
A. THE ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The seedlings of the environmental justice movement first
appeared in the late 1960s.' 5 Nurtured by a decade of heightened social awareness, 6 the civil rights movement expanded its
focus to include concerns about the urban environment. 17 During this period, minority groups began rallying against the inequitable distribution of municipal services." Concerned communities initiated a string of lawsuits against local
governmental agencies for failing to provide acceptable sanitation, street lighting, and water supplies."

The paradigmatic lawsuit of this movement was Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw.2 0 In this case, a group of African-American

citizens sued Shaw, Mississippi, alleging that the town provided various municipal services-including street paving,
street lighting, sanitary sewers, surface water drainage, water
mains, and fire hydrants-in a racially discriminatory man-

ner.2 ' Such actions, the plaintiffs claimed, violated the Four-

14. Barry E. Hill, Lemons Into Lemonade, ENVTL. F., May-June 2002, at
32 (quoting Christine Todd Whitman) (citation omitted).
15. See Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism:
FindingEnvironmentalJustice'sPlace in EnvironmentalRegulation, 26 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 n.9 (2002) (discussing early examples of environmental

injustice).
16. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of
United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First
Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 79-82 (2001) (discussing several events during the 1960s that raised social awareness).
17. See Been, supra note 1, at 1003 n.9 (stating that the quest for justice
in the siting of locally undesirable land uses is the "flip-side of the inequitable
municipal services movement of the 1960s").
18. See id.
19. See Yang, supra note 15, at 4 n.9; see also Hawkins v. Town of Shaw,
437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir.
1986); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Johnson v.
City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
20. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
21. Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1288.
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teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.22 The plaintiffs
supported their argument with disturbing facts. AfricanAmericans occupied approximately 98% of the homes in the
town of Shaw that faced unpaved streets and 97% of the homes
not served by sanitary sewers.23 In addition to citing statistical
disparities, the plaintiffs demonstrated that pervasive residential segregation greatly contributed to a long history of municipal discrimination.2 4 In light of these facts, the court found that
the plaintiffs made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination subject to strict scrutiny.25 Accordingly, the court concluded
that no compelling state interest could justify the discriminatory results of Shaw's distribution of municipal services26 and
granted the plaintiffs injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.27
Hawkins v. Shaw became the template for successful municipal service equalization claims. This template was first followed in Johnson v. City of Arcadia.2 9 In this case, AfricanAmerican citizens of Arcadia, Florida, sought to ameliorate disparities in the quality and quantity of street paving services,
parks and recreational facilities, and water supply systems.3 °
They claimed that the city's actions regarding these services
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause,' section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,32 and
the Revenue Sharing Act.3 ' In analyzing these claims, the court
set forth a new, more difficult test to determine whether the
inequitable distribution amounted to a constitutional viola22. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23. Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1288-91.
24. See id. at 1287-88 (discussing residential segregation and "the other
side of the tracks" phenomena).
25. Id. at 1288.
26. Id. at 1292.
27. Id. at 1288. Plaintiffs were using § 1983 as the vehicle to assert their
equal protection claim. See id.
28. See Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 983 (11th Cir. 1986); Dowdell
v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. City of
Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (M.D. Fla. 1978).

29. See Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1367.
30.

Id. at 1367, 1370-76.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
33. State and Local Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1242 (1976)
(expired 1976). The Revenue Sharing Act distributed federal funds from a
trust to state and local governments to aid community problems for a scheduled five-year period, running from January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1976.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, REVENUE SHARING AND CIVIL RIGHTS, at ii (1975).

31.
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tion.34 The test required the plaintiffs to establish three elements: (1) the existence of racially identifiable neighborhoods
in the municipality; (2) substantial inferiority in the quality or
quantity of the municipal services in question; and (3) proof of
intent or motive. 5 As in Hawkins, the plaintiffs established all
three elements by demonstrating statistical disparities in the
provision of municipal services36 and continuing residential
segregation perpetuated by historical discrimination on the
part of the city.3 7 The court reasoned that such evidence was

sufficient to demonstrate intent to discriminate,38 and it consequently found for the plaintiffs on all claims.39
Two later cases also paralleled Hawkins and Johnson in
their attempts to pursue municipal service equalization. In
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, ° a class of African-American residents sued the City of Apopka, Florida, its mayor, and four city
council members for inequitable provision of street paving and
maintenance services, storm water drainage, water distribution, sewer facilities, and park and recreational facilities. 41 This
case was structured identically to Johnson and asserted claims
under the Equal Protection Clause, section 601 of Title VI, and
the Revenue Sharing Act.42 Once again, the court ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs.43 In so holding, the court paid particular attention to the cumulative evidence of municipal action and inaction as indicative of discriminatory intent." The court also focused on deprivation of the African-American community as a
foreseeable outcome of the city's actions and as evidence of intent to discriminate.45 Similarly, the court in Ammons v. Dade

34.

See Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1379.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 1370-76.
37. Id. at 1369-70. The court did not limit its consideration of historical
discrimination to housing and zoning; it also looked at the underrepresenta-

tion of minorities in local political bodies. See id.
38. It is worth noting that Washington v. Davis made intent to discriminate a necessary element of an equal protection claim after Hawkins. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). This presented the plaintiffs in
Johnson with a new hurdle to overcome.
39. Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1380.
40. 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 1184.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1186.
44. Id. at 1185-86.
45. Id. at 1186.
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CitY46 -following Hawkins4"-used the foreseeability of the dep-

rivation of services from the minority community to infer intent
to discriminate. 8 In addition, the court focused on the size of
the disparity and the nature of the practices at issue to help infer intent from disparate impact.49 Consistent with precedent,
the court held that the city's inequitable distribution of resources violated the Equal Protection Clause."
B. EMERGENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

The emergence of a vocal environmental movement in the
1960s and 1970s played an instrumental role in the development of environmental justice. During this period, the media 5
and urban conditions generated public concern for environmental issues.52 The publication of Rachel Carson's Silent
Spring,53 the burning of the Cuyahoga River,54 and overwhelming smog problems captured public attention." The public responded by supporting environmental organizations" and celebrating the first Earth Day in 1970. 57
Eager for a reprieve from the contentiousness of the civil
rights movement and the Vietnam War, Congress also adopted
an environmental bent. 8 During the 1970s, Congress enacted
several groundbreaking environmental statutes, such as the
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act. 9
The judiciary quickly fell in line. 0 Several judges attempted to
embolden these new environmental statutes, interpreting them
to provide more environmental protection than lawmakers
46. 783 F.2d 982 (llth Cir. 1986).
47. See id. at 983 (citing Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
48. Id. at 988.
49. Id. at 987-88.
50. Id. at 988.
51. Lincoln L. Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Movement: What a HistoricalJuxtapositionof the Legal Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has to Teach EnvironmentalistsToday, 31 ENVTL. L. 229, 284 (2001).
52. Id. at 282-83.
53. Id.
54. See Lazarus, supra note 16, at 79.
55. Davies, supra note 51, at 284.
56. See Lazarus, supra note 16, at 80.
57. Id. at 79.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 80.
60. See id.
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likely intended. 6' In addition, some courts attempted to relax
restricted judicial access for environstanding barriers that
62
mental citizen suits.
Not all groups were pleased with this newfound focus on
environmental issues.63 Civil rights advocates believed that it
drew attention away from the continuing effects of segregation
and discrimination.' Some feared Congress's new regulatory
efforts would disproportionately disadvantage minority
neighborhoods. 65 Having witnessed distributional inequity in
the municipal services context, civil rights groups were concerned about the potential for similar treatment with regard to
environmental regulation.6 6
C. EMERGENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

From these beginnings, a coordinated environmental justice movement emerged. The commonly accepted beginning of
the movement was an uprising in Afton, North Carolina.
Afton was a predominantly low-income African-American
community, deemed by the state of North Carolina to be an
appropriate site to dump 32,000 cubic yards of soil contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). 61 In response to
this plan, civil rights leaders and environmental activists coordinated a series of demonstrations opposing the site. 69 The protests successfully drew attention to the claim that poor communities of color were unfairly targeted as sites for toxic waste

61. Id. (detailing how activist judges extended the meanings of the new
pieces of environmental legislation).
62. Id.
63. Yang, supra note 13, at 149.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. For example, one scholar claimed that the new focus on environmental issues was "a deliberate attempt by a bigoted and selfish white
middle-class society to perpetuate its own values and protect its own life style
at the expense of the poor and the under privileged." Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental
Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 788 (1993) (quoting James N. Smith, The
Coming of Age of Environmentalism in American Society, in ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN URBAN AMERICA 1 (James N. Smith ed.,
1974)).

67. Lynn E. Blais, EnvironmentalRacism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV.
75, 77 (1996).
68. Id. at 77-78.
69. Id. at 78.
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dumps and heavily polluting industries."
Several reports published in the 1980s provided statistical
support for the developing environmental justice concerns."
Notably, the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial
Justice (CRJ)performed an extensive study on the relationship
between the siting of hazardous waste facilities and the racial
composition of host communities.72 This study found a correlation between the number of hazardous waste facilities located
in a community and the percentage of the community's minority population. 3 It also identified race as the most significant
variable in determining the location of hazardous waste facilities.74 Several subsequent studies buttressed the CRJ's findings.
These studies, and the Afton uprising, helped frame the
initial scope of environmental justice. In its youth, environmental justice centered on what Dr. Benjamin Chavis termed
C4
environmental
racism, ,71 generally addressing racially motivated facility siting." Gradually, the focus of environmental
justice expanded.7 ' New concerns included distributional equity79
across all population groups, risk reduction and avoidance,
and the enforcement of environmental laws. 0 These shifts gave
• 81
environmental justice its current, more expansive perspective.

70. Id.
71. See Nicole C. Kibert, Green Justice: A Holistic Approach to Environmental Injustice, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 169, 171 (2001) (discussing several early environmental justice studies).
72. Yang, supra note 13, at 150.
73. Been, supra note 1, at 1010.
74. Yang, supra note 13, at 150.
75. Been, supra note 1, at 1012. Been highlights several local studies,
which support the proposition that minority representation is disproportionately large near hazardous waste sites. See id.
76. See Richard J. Lazarus, "EnvironmentalRacism! That's What It Is.",
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 255, 257 (stating that Chavis's words were "a transforming moment for environmental law in the United States").
77. See id. at 259.
78. See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,681, 10,682-83 (2000) (discussing the shifting conceptions
of the environmental justice phenomena).
79. See id. Previously, redistribution of risk had been the primary object
of concern.
80. Eileen Gauna, EPA at 30: Fairness in Environmental Protection, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,528, 10,528 n.5 (2001).
81. See Kuehn, supra note 78, at 10,681.

202

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:193

D. MODERN ATTITUDES TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Modern attitudes toward environmental justice are difficult to gauge. Undoubtedly, environmental justice remains an
important social and political issue;12 yet, public and political
support for the movement may be fading slightly. 3 This trend,
however, is consistent with current trends of environmental
law and civil rights generally.' Professor Richard J. Lazarus
calls this the "graying of U.S. environmental law."8 5 As environmental justice matures and creeps away from its 1990s heyday, it is beginning to lose some of its passion.86 Thus, as with
environmental law and civil rights, environmental justice ap817
pears to have fallen slightly out of vogue.
II. LEGAL PATHWAYS AVAILABLE
TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CLAIMANTS
No specific legislation addresses actions for environmental

justice per se. 8 Plaintiffs in environmental justice suits must
retrofit various legal theories to the facts of their case. Legal
tools employed in these suits include environmental statutes,

82. See Davies, supra note 51, at 354 (discussing the modern implications
of environmental justice).
83. This appears to be a fair conclusion given the recent proposed replacement of EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman-and her commitment to environmental justice-with former Utah Governor Mike Leavitt.
Press Release, EPA, Administrator Whitman Reaffirms Commitment to Environmental Justice (Aug. 21, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov
oswer/ej/pdf/pr082101.pdf; Michael Kilian, Senate Committee OKs Leavitt,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2003, at 13, and the Bush Administration's rollback of the
Clean Air Act's power plant pollution provisions. Natural Resources Defense
Council, EPA Officially Rolls Back Clean Air Act Protections, (Aug. 27, 2003),
available at http://www.nrdc.org/bushrecord/airenergy-powerplants.asp#1409
(last visited Oct. 16, 2003). Articles written prior to the Bush Administration,
however, claimed that support for environmental justice was on the rise. See
Davies, supra note 51, at 349, 354; see also Jason Pinney, The FederalRegulatory Commission and Environmental Justice: Do the National Environmental
Policy Act and the ClearAir Act Offer a Better Way?, 30 B.C. L. REV. 353, 363
(2003) ("It is too early to tell how environmental justice will fare under the
George W. Bush Administration.").
84. Davies, supra note 51, at 350
85. Lazarus, supra note 16, at 76.
86. Id.; see also Davies, supra note 51, at 233-34 (providing statistics
which demonstrate that, on a macro level, support for environmentalism is
fading).
87. See Lazarus, supra note 16, at 105-06 (discussing the maturation of
environmental law).
88. Id. at 101.
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common law property claims, constitutional challenges, and
civil rights laws.8 These tools have been used with infrequent
success and have generally exposed major shortcomings in environmental justice litigation.
A. ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
In the environmental justice context, the efficacy of environmental statutes has been limited primarily to attempts at
derailing the permitting of hazardous waste facilities. 9° Recently, however, some academics have begun reexamining environmental statutes, in particular those with public participation requirements. Under this approach, plaintiffs attempt to

identify defendants' failures to meet the public participation
requirements of an environmental statute in an attempt to ensure procedural justice.91 Plaintiffs, however, have been reluc-

tant to put this strategy into practice. 9 Consequently, it is difficult to evaluate its merits.
B. COMMON LAW PROPERTY CLAIMS

Public and private nuisance actions present significant obstacles to minority communities as plaintiffs in environmental
justice cases.9 3 In large measure, the environmental statutes
supplant common law remedies. 94 As a result, facility compli-

ance with applicable environmental statutes negates the possibility of establishing a per se public nuisance. Such compliance also cuts against plaintiffs' attempts to establish
intentional or unreasonable conduct as either private or public

89. Julia B. Latham Worsham, DisparateImpact Lawsuits Under Title VI,
Section 602: Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 631, 632 (2000).
90. See Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation:Another Stone in
David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 527-28 (1994).
91. Id. at 528-30 (discussing the implementation of this approach in El
Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 ENVTL. L. REP.
20357 (1991)); see also Hill, supra note 14, at 33 (describing this idea as "Environmental Law, With a Twist"). Environmental statutes typically provide for
public participation through comment periods, which allow citizens to express
their concerns regarding proposed projects. See id.
92. See Cole, supra note 90, at 541-43 (discussing instances in which the
theory has been presented to the court).
93. See Worsham, supra note 89, at 640.
94. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 87-89, 113-17 (3d ed. 2000).
95. Id.

204

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:193

nuisance. 96 Combined with the nebulousness of the public nuisance standard, these factors render success uncertain.9" Con-

sequently, public and private nuisance claims present an
unlikely pathway for pursuing environmental justice.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is another legal pathway available to environmental justice plaintiffs.98 The right to equal protection prohibits government officials from basing decisions regarding the distribution
of environmental harms, risks, or benefits on racial grounds. 99
To prove a violation, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the government intended to discriminate when making its decision.'01
The difficulty of meeting this requirement has severely diminished the success of equal protection claims in the environmental justice context.'0 ' Environmental justice plaintiffs generally attempt to demonstrate discriminatory intent from stark
patterns of disparate impact resulting from a governmental ac-

tion.'02 The courts, however, have been reluctant to infer such
intent absent additional evidence."' Then, even if the plaintiffs
establish discriminatory intent, the government can still succeed by showing that the same decision would have resulted
regardless of the racial motivation." 4 Consequently, the equal
protection standard has been difficult, if not impossible, for environmental justice plaintiffs to meet.' °9 In the inequitable dis96. Worsham, supra note 89, at 640.
97. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 707 (Ariz.
1972) ("The law of nuisance affords no rigid rule to be applied in all instances.") (quoting Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 104 N.E. 371, 373 (Mass.
1914)).
98. James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 125, 145 (1994).
99. Hill, supra note 14, at 32.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 33.
102. Id. at 33-34.
103. See id. In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that, although disparate impact was not irrelevant, proof of discriminatory intent was
necessary for a valid equal protection claim. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
104. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Dev. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
270-71 n.21 (1977).
105. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991)
(acknowledging the existence of a disparate impact on minorities, but stating
that plaintiffs lacked the evidence necessary to show discriminatory intent); E.
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tribution cases, however, courts have readily inferred intent to
discriminate from racially disparate impact."06
No judicial rea10 7
soning exists to explain this inconsistency.
D. TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Environmental justice suits and scholarship have recently
focused on Title VI, °8 in particular sections 601'09 and 602,10 as
a potentially useful legal tool. ' Section 601 prohibits discrimination against minorities in programs and activities receiving
federal funding.12 It is commonly understood that enforcement
of this section requires a showing of intent to discriminate.13 As
a result, it is subject to the same limitations as the Equal Protection Clause.1 4 Section 602 authorizes federal agencies to
create regulations pursuant to the goals of section 601 that
Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 886 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs did not
show any prior events to support a determination that race was a motivating
factor despite strong evidence of disparate impact); Bean v. Southwestern
Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that, despite plaintiffs' showing of disparate siting, the plaintiffs failed to prove discriminatory intent).
106. Lazarus, supra note 66, at 833.
107. See Hill, supra note 14, at 33. This discrepancy is probably a result of
several factors. For one, the civil rights movement was at its height in the
1970s, which forced the courts to be receptive to such suits. In addition, municipal services equalization allowed courts to compare recipients' benefits.
This was easier than trying to redistribute the risks and burdens associated
with industrial facility siting, as required by environmental justice suits. See
infra Part III.A.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 2000d-1.
111. See Lazarus, supra note 66, at 834-39 (discussing the validity of Title
VI as a legal mechanism for the environmental justice movement); Yang,
supra note 13, at 143-92 (discussing the usefulness of Title VI in environmental justice suits); Cody, supra note 9, at 238-62 (discussing the role of Title VI in recent environmental justice suits); Hill, supra note 14, at 39-41 (discussing the usefulness of Title VI in environmental justice suits).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). This statute states the following: "No person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
113. Worsham, supra note 89, at 645; see also Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (requiring intent to discriminate); Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (same).
114. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (stating plaintiffs bringing
Equal Protection claim must prove intentional discrimination).
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provide means for the agencies to deal with complaints of racial
discrimination.'15 The regulations issued by several federal
agencies bar programs that result in a racially disparate impact. 116 For example, the EPA's regulations state that:
A recipient [of EPA funding] shall not choose a site or location of a facility that has the purpose or effect of excluding individuals from, denying them the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination under any program to which this Part applies on the grounds of race,
color, or national origin or sex; or with the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of
this subpart.'

Initially, it was believed that both an administrative complaint1 ' and a private right of action" 9 could enforce these regulations. Indeed, many recent environmental justice advocates'
efforts centered on utilizing the latter approach to pursue their
goals.120 A recent Supreme Court decision, however, crushed
these efforts.
In Alexander v. Sandoval,121 the Supreme Court ruled that
no private right of action exists to enforce disparate impact

115. Worsham, supra note 89, at 645; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000).
116. Cody, supra note 9, at 235. A presidential task force produced model
section 602 regulations using a disparate impact standard. Id. Subsequently,
federal agencies adopted similar regulations. Id. In GuardiansAss'n v. Civil
Service Commission, the Supreme Court recognized that section 602 regulations may validly prohibit disparate impact discrimination. 463 U.S. 582, 601
(1983).
117. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (2000).
118. See Worsham, supra note 89, at 647-48. Under this approach, citizens
could complain to the agency, prompting the agency to investigate and, theoretically, reprimand violators. The EPA weakly enforced disparate impact
regulations and, as a result, citizens brought few administrative complaints.
Id. President Clinton attempted to remedy this problem by issuing Executive
Order No. 12,898 (EO) requiring federal agencies to "make achieving environmental justice part of its mission." Denis Binder et al., A Survey of Federal
Agency Response to President Clinton's Executive Order No. 12898 on Environmental Justice, 31 ENVTL. L. REP 11,133, 11,134 (2001) (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 389 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000)).
119. Worsham, supra note 89, at 664. The EPA's Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits, written
in response to President Clinton's EO, provided individuals with a private
right of action to enforce the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VI. Id.
120. See id. at 663-68 (discussing the usefulness of section 602 to environmental justice actions); Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action
Under EPA's Title VI Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1-58 (1999) (evaluating the possibility of environmental justice suits to enforce section 602 disparate impact regulations).
121. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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regulations promulgated under section 602.122 The Alabama
Department of Public Safety's decision to administer driver's
license tests only in English caused the dispute in this case.'2 3
Non-English-speaking citizens brought a class action to enjoin
this decision, using the Department of Justice's section 602
regulations as a vehicle. 124 In foreclosing this strategy, the
Court eschewed the plaintiffs' beliefs that private rights of action could be implied in a statute. 125 It reasoned that Congress
must explicitly express a private right of action. 26 Absent congressional language creating a private right, regulations could
not provide such a right. 127 Consequently, the Court found that
section 602's enforcement mechanisms were available only to
government agencies and not to private individuals. 28 In a
vehement dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's reasoning, stating that its opinion was "something of a sport."29
He further critiqued, "Litigants who in the future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations... in all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to obtain relief."' 30
E. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The case South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (Camden II)'' imme122. Id. at 293.
123. Id. at 278-79.
124. Id. at 279.
125. See id. at 286-87.
126. Id. at 286 (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578
(1979)).
127. Id. at 291.
128. Id. at 289-90.
129. Id. at 300.
130. Id.
131. 145 F. Supp. 2d 505, 516-18 (D.N.J. 2001) [hereinafter Camden III. It
is important to note the procedural history of this case. Initially the plaintiffs,
South Camden Citizens in Action, sued the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) for failing to consider the racially disparate
impacts of the agency's issuance of a permit for a cement plant as required by
applicable section 602 regulations. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't
of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450-52 (D.N.J. 2001) [hereinafter Camden I]. Judge Orlofsky granted the plaintiffs' desired injunction, holding that
they established a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination in violation of section 602. Id. at 451-52. Immediately thereafter, the Supreme Court
issued its ruling in the Sandoval case, effectively rejecting the judge's reasoning. As a result, Judge Orlofsky reconvened the parties to determine if the section 602 regulations were enforceable under § 1983. See Camden 11, 145 F.
Supp. 2d at 508-10.
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diately tested Justice Stevens's suggestion that § 1983132 might
provide a private right of action. In this case, the plaintiffs
claimed, and the district court agreed, that the holding in
Sandoval only prohibited the use of a freestanding cause of action under section 602,33 and that it did not forbid the use of
§ 1983 as a method of recourse.13 The court reasoned that the
Sandoval decision assumed that Congress intended the statute
to create a substantive right.135 Hence, the disparate impact
regulations were enforceable under § 1983. Sandoval, the court
argued, only barred the direct cause of action.'36 Thus, precedent regarding section 602 remained valid. 37 The court claimed
that this conclusion was consistent with governing precedent in
the Third Circuit as established in Powell v. Ridge,35 which
held that plaintiffs seeking to enforce section 602 disparate impact regulations could do so directly under section 602 or via
§ 1983 .139 The court also cited Wright v. City of Roanoke to support its proposition that regulations may create rights enforceable under § 1983. " ° Finally, the court applied the federal

132. In relevant part, § 1983 states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
133. See Camden 11, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
134. See id. at 517.
135. See id. ("[Tihe Court limited the question decided in Sandoval to determining whether Congress intended to create a private remedy to enforce
§ 602, while assuming that in fact Congress intended that statute, to create a
substantive right. . .

136. Id. at 518.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 403 (3d Cir. 1999).
140. Camden 11, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27 (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke 479 U.S. 418 (1987)). Wright stands for the proposition that agency regulations can create federal rights enforceable under § 1983. See Wright, 479
U.S. at 431-32.
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rights test from Blessing14 ' to ensure the EPA's disparate impact regulations created a federally enforceable right under
§ 1983. Based upon this analysis, the court concluded that the
defendants had infringed on an enforceable4 2 right and, consequently, it granted the requested injunction.
Shortly thereafter, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (Camden III) reversed the district
court's decision. "3 The Third Circuit held that:
[A]n administrative regulation cannot create an interest enforceable
under section 1983 unless the interest already is implicit in the statute authorizing the regulation, and that inasmuch as Title VI proscribes only intentional discrimination, the plaintiffs do not have a
right enforceable through a 1983 action
under the EPA's disparate
4
impact discrimination regulations.1

In support, the Third Circuit stated that "a majority of the
Supreme Court never has stated expressly that a valid regulation can create such a right."" 5 Further, the Third Circuit reasoned that "Wright does not hold that a regulation alone-i.e.,
where the alleged right does not appear explicitly in the statute, but only appears in the regulation-may create an enforceable federal right.' 46 Of primary importance to the Third
147
Circuit was Congress's intent to create an enforceable right.
Such intent, it concluded, must be expressed on the face of the
statute.'48 To the disappointment
of many, the Supreme Court
4 9
subsequently denied certiorari.

141. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997). The federal rights
test states that:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question
benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
right assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third,
the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the
States.
Id. (citations omitted).
142. See Camden H, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 535-47.
143. Camden III, 274 F.3d at 774.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 781.
146. Id. at 783.
147. See id. at 788.
148. See id. at 790.
149. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 536 U.S.
939 (2002).
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III. REEXAMINING THE ROOTS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: TAKING A FRESH
LOOK AT CASES INVOLVING THE INEQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPAL BENEFITS
So, what is next? As a result of Sandoval5 and Camden
111,1 the environmental justice movement needs a new legal
avenue through which to pursue its goals. A possible solution
exists in the movement's roots. Specifically, environmental justice suits may be successfully modeled after the early cases involving the inequitable distribution of municipal services. 15 By
analogizing to these cases, and emphasizing their similarity of
concern with environmental justice, the movement can revive
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in a
fresh context.
The early municipal services cases are an appropriate
source of guidance for two reasons. First, they succeeded. 53 The
plaintiffs in these cases successfully drew inferences of intent
to discriminate from statistical disparities, residential segregation patterns, and historical evidence of discrimination."5 These
facts required the municipalities to establish a compelling justification for their actions in accordance with strict scrutiny-a
hurdle that they were unable to overcome. 55 Second, environmental justice cases parallel municipal service cases in several
respects. For example, at their most basic level, both involve
dissimilar treatment of minority communities by municipal
governments. 156 More specifically, they involve the inequitable
allocation of rights and benefits between minority and nonmi-

150. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); see also supra notes 12130 and accompanying text (discussing Sandoval).
151. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d
771 (3d Cir. 2001); see also supra Part IL.E (discussing Camden III).
152. See discussion supra Part L.A (discussing inequitable distribution of
municipal services cases).
153. See supra notes 20-50 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 23-25, 34-39 and accompanying text (noting types of
evidence presented by plaintiffs in inequitable distribution of municipal services cases).
155. See supra notes 20-50 and accompanying text; see also Hawkins v.
Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1292 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Having determined that
no compelling state interests can possibly justify the discriminatory results of
Shaw's administration of municipal services, we conclude that violation of
equal protection has occurred.").
156. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text (documenting inequitable distribution of municipal services).

2003]

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

nority communities.' 57 Both also seek to remedy existing disparities and achieve equitable treatment for minorities.' 58 In
order to better understand these parallels, however, it is first
necessary to examine the reasons behind the successes of the
municipal service equalization cases.
A. ELEMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCCESS
IN MUNICIPAL SERVICES CASES

Perhaps more than anything, the success of the municipal
services equalization cases could be attributed to the presence
of a spatially isolated and identifiable minority." 9 These areas
frequently elicited sympathetic responses from the courts because they represented the chronically neglected "other side of
the tracks." 6 ° The courts viewed these areas as evidence of continued racial segregation.16 ' To be sure, these areas prompted
the courts to evaluate the historical evidence of restrictive zoning and housing practices that resulted in residential segregation,"' which frequently led to a finding of intentional discrimination. 163 In addition, the presentation of such distinct areas
was responsible for successful claims because it provided the
court with a clear view of the differential treatment of minority
and nonminority communities. From this vantage, the courts
easily concluded that race was a factor in the differential
treatment at issue.
The sheer number of amenities being distributed inequitably was another core element contributing to the success of the

157. See supra Part I.A.
158. See supra notes 15-39 and accompanying text (offering examples of
early municipal services cases where plaintiffs sought equitable distribution of
services).
159. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing racially
identifiable neighborhood as an element required of plaintiffs in a municipal
services case).
160. See Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1287.
161. See supra notes 23-27, 36-50 and accompanying text (discussing evidence presented by successful plaintiffs claiming inequitable distribution of
municipal services).
162. See Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1986) (discuss-

ing historical evidence of racially restrictive zoning); Dowdell v. City of
Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1983) (same); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1368-69 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (same).
163. See supra notes 25-27, 34-50 and accompanying text (documenting
cases finding intentional discrimination in the distribution of municipal services).
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municipal services cases.'64 The fact that municipalities denied
African-Americans the benefit of more than one service piqued
the courts' attention to statistical evidence of these disparities.
The courts uniformly deferred to such statistical representations. 165 The Hawkins court's remark that "figures speak and
when they do, [c]ourts listen" is an example of judicial deference.1 66 In addition, inequitable distribution of multiple services
clearly demonstrated the municipalities' unresponsiveness to
the needs of African-Americans. If only one service had been
involved, the courts might have overlooked the municipalities'
inaction. The presence of multiple inequities, however, made
the neglect of African-Americans' rights to municipal amenities
overt. 167 Finally, inequitable distribution of multiple services
had the effect of slanting the totality of the evidence sharply in
favor of the minority groups. 6 ' In the face of several inequities,
it became easier for courts to infer intent to discriminate circumstantially.'69
The tangible nature of municipal services also factored
prominently into the success of municipal service equalization
cases. The presence and quality of pavement, pipes, and water
pressure were readily observable. Consequently, the courts had
no difficulty discerning whether a municipal benefit had been
bestowed on African-Americans and whites alike. 7 6 They were
not bemused by complex scientific standards as frequently
occurs in environmental justice suits. The fact that municipal
benefits were at issue, as opposed to burdens, also aided the
courts' analyses. As municipal benefits, the services were discussed as rights to be conferred similarly. 7 ' Once a municipality elected to provide services, it was required to do so equally
or it risked violating the Equal Protection Clause. 72 Viewing
the services in this manner allowed the courts to make apples164. See Ammons, 783 F.2d at 984-88; Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1184-86; Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1288-92; Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1369-80.
165. See supra notes 20-50 and accompanying text.
166. Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1288 (quoting Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 9 (5th
Cir. 1966)).
167. See Ammons, 783 F.2d at 984-88; Dowdell 698 F.2d at 1184-86; Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1288-92; Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1367-80.
168. See Dowdell, 698 F.2d at 1186 (analyzing the "totality of the relevant
facts" as outlined in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
169. See supra Part I.A.
170. See supra Part I.A.
171. See Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at 1378.
172. Id.
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to-apples type comparisons. A benefit was or was not conferred
equally. No gradations muddied the comparison. With municipally created burdens, however, no such equitable distribution
requirement existed."' Thus, comparisons between communities could not be drawn as easily regarding burdens.
Another key to minority communities' success was the
courts' willingness to consider historical evidence of discrimination.'74 In doing so, the courts primarily looked at racially
restrictive zoning ordinances, residential development patterns, and a presence or lack of minority political representation. 175 These factors emphasized the minority communities'
political powerlessness and forced the courts to recognize municipalities' intents to discriminate.176 With minority communities cast as politically disadvantaged and underrepresented,
their needs acquired a sense of urgency, to which the courts
responded favorably.
B. PARALLELS BETWEEN MUNICIPAL SERVICES
AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

As stated previously, several parallels exist between municipal services cases and environmental justice cases. Indeed,
in many respects these topics are nearly identical. Both involve
municipal inattentiveness to the needs of minority communities. Environmental justice focuses on the physical and environmental health of these communities, whereas municipal
equalization cases concentrate on the provision of municipal
amenities.177 Further, both types of cases view the failure of

173. See Camden III, 274 F.3d at 771-91 (demonstrating that disparate
distribution of environmental burdens does not amount to discrimination).
174. See Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 987-88 (11th Cir. 1986);
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1983); Hawkins v.
Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286,1289 (5th Cir. 1971); Johnson, 450 F. Supp. at
1368-71 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
175. See supra notes 20-27, 34-50 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 20-27, 34-50 and accompanying text. Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. used the following five
factors for consideration in determining intent to discriminate:
(1) a significant statistical disparity; (2) the historical background of
the decision or action; (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to
the challenged decision or action; (4) procedural or substantive departures from the normal course of action; and (5) the legislative or administrative history of the decision or action.
429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977).
177. See supra Parts I.A, I.C.
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municipalities to address these areas of concern as evidence of
racial discrimination.' 8 Both are frequently brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and Title VI
and, hence, constitute antidiscrimination suits."9 Environmental justice has reflected this view since its inception, when
it was aptly referred to as "environmental racism."8 ° This similarity of vision also reflects the movements' consistency of purpose. Each attempts to counteract municipal action that perpetuates residential segregation and discrimination. In
addition, each seeks to protect the rights of minority communities and to ensure that they are accorded the same treatment
as nonminority communities.' As a result of these parallels, it
follows that courts should behave similarly towards municipal
services and environmental justice suits, provided they are
framed alike.
IV. ANALOGIZING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE SUITS
TO THE INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES
Analogizing environmental justice to municipal services
suits allows the movement to present equal protection claims in
environmental suits in a more successful posture than those
postured under environmental statutes. Presenting environmental justice in this manner requires framing the suits in accordance with the major elements of the municipal services
cases. This will likely require openly referencing and drawing
182
parallels to the municipal services cases. Structuring environmental justice in this manner confers two primary benefits.
First, it imbues the suits with authoritative precedent from the
municipal services cases. Second, it breathes novelty and
straightforwardness into the pursuit of environmental justice
objectives.' 3
A. A How-To GUIDE
What follows is a guide for structuring environmental suits
178. See supra Parts IA, I.C.
179. See supra Parts I.A, I.C.
180. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Parts I.A, I.C.
182. See discussion supra Part I.A.
183. Structuring environmental justice suits claims like municipal service
claims will also bring new life to the environmental justice movement, whose
popularity is waning. See discussion supra Part I.D.
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so as to take advantage of the municipal services equalization
cases.
1. Relief Sought
In determining how to structure an environmental justice
suit, it is important to consider the relief desired. Municipal
services equalization suits generally sought both injunctive and
declaratory relief in order to eliminate the municipal service
disparities and to prevent similar conduct in the future. 8 4 So, if

plaintiffs desire injunctive and declaratory relief, modeling environmental justice suits after municipal service equalization
cases seems appropriate. 18*5 If plaintiffs want damages, however, the municipal service model will be of limited use.
2. Whom to Sue
Municipal service equalization suits provided clear guidelines on whom to sue-whatever entities played a role in creating and perpetuating the disparities at issue. 86 Traditionally,
this meant the city and the relevant decision-making officials
(e.g., the mayor and city council members).'8 7 In the environmental justice context, however, the entities sued may differ
slightly. Specifically, because environmental justice tends to focus on the differential siting and permitting of polluting facilities, ' 8 the entities sued should be relevant to those actions.
Such entities include the municipal zoning board, the municipal planning board, the permitting agency, the polluting facility
(if it received federal funding), and the city and its officials who
helped place the facility in its current location. 89 The municipal
zoning and planning boards are important because they determine whether industrial activities fit with the surrounding
neighborhood. They are the entities most likely to have an
identifiable history of discrimination.' ° The permitting agency

184. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1292-93 (5th Cir.
1971).
185. See discussion supra Part I.A.
186. See Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 984-88 (11th Cir. 1986);
Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d at 1184-86 (11th Cir. 1983); Hawkins,
437 F.2d at 1288-92; Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1367-80
(M.D. Fla. 1978).
187. See supra notes 21, 41 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part I.C.
189. See supra notes 21, 41 and accompanying text.
190. See text accompanying infra notes 213-16.
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is also a prime target because it reviews related evidence before
acceding to a facility's actions. For example, in the Camden
cases, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
was the permitting agency and the focus of the plaintiffs'
claims, and was aware of the neighborhood's constituents and
condition prior to permitting.' As this illustrates, it can be
plausibly argued that the foreseeable outcome of a permitting
agency's action would be to disadvantage a minority community. To bring suit against the company operating the facility,
however, it must receive federal funding, making it liable for
discriminatory actions under section 601 of Title VI. 192 Absent
this funding, the facility cannot be included in the suit. Finally,
the city and its officials also should be included as parties
if
9 3
they demonstrate a nexus with the disparities at issue.
3.

Claims to Bring

The municipal service equalization cases routinely asserted
claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, section 601 of Title VI, and the Revenue Sharing Act. ' The first two claims have also been repeatedly invoked in the environmental justice context.'19 As a result, they
should be asserted when attempting to analogize to municipal
service equalization cases. Due to a sunset provision, the Revenue Sharing Act' 96 is no longer available for environmental justice plaintiffs. In its place, plaintiffs may use section 5309 of
the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA). 97 This
Act is novel as applied to environmental justice.9 Section 5309
states that a municipality or political subdivision may not use
community development funds appropriated under the HCDA
in making selections or locating facilities in areas that deny
minority communities the benefits of such facilities.1 99 This
T

191. See supra Part II.E.
192. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Part I.A.
194. See text accompanying supra notes 31-33, 42.
195. See supra Parts II.C, II.D.
196. State and Local Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1224(b) (1976)
(expired 1976) (stating appropriations schedule). Note that this is more commonly referred to as the Revenue Sharing Act.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (2002).
198. Recently, in Miller v. City of Dallas, this claim was asserted in the environmental justice context. Miller v. City of Dallas, No. 3: 98-CV-2955-D,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2341, *9-10 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002).
199. See id. Note, however, that § 5309 does not provide a direct cause of
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cause of action may prove successful in environmental justice
cases because facility siting likely involves federal funds appropriated for community development.
4. Structuring the Complaint
In modeling an environmental justice complaint on municipal service equalization suits, it is important to demonstrate that the action in question deprives the minority community of a municipal benefit. °° Doing so forces the court to
determine whether the benefit has been conferred, and if so,
whether it has been conferred equitably.2 1
Developing this framework involves shifting the discussion
from the harm done to the minority community to the lack of a
corresponding benefit.2 2 For example, instead of pointing to the
burden presented by the disparate siting of heavily polluting
industries, the complaint should focus on the municipality's
failure to equitably provide protection from industrial nuisances and to zone in a nondiscriminatory manner. This could
also be done by demonstrating similarities between concerns
regarding the quality of municipal services and the quality of
natural resources (e.g., comparing the quality of mechanisms
used to distribute water to water quality in general).
Structuring suits in terms of municipal benefits allows the
plaintiffs to discuss rights and entitlements in the complaint,
which benefits the plaintiffs in two ways. 2°' First, it forces
courts to take notice of a municipality's failure to equitably
provide rights.2 4 When a municipality fails to confer this right,
it serves as an indicator of discriminatory intent to the court. 205
Second, focusing on rights also makes the disputed deprivation
more accessible to the court. While community burdens occur in
varying degrees, benefits either have or have not been distributed. Presenting rights in this binary manner allows for a more
action for plaintiffs. Consequently, plaintiffs likely will have to use § 1983 as a
mechanism for bringing the claim. See id.
200. See supra notes 17-42 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 17.
203. See supra Part I.A; see also Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp.
1363, 1378 (M.D. Fla. 1978) ("Once a municipality elects to provide services, it
must provide equal services to the minority community or the City violates the

Equal Protection Clause.").
204. It is generally understood that citizens possess a right to the equitable
distribution of municipal benefits. See supra note 203.
205. See supra note 203.
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tangible comparison and prevents the court from being mired
in scientific complexity. °6
To fit environmental justice suits into the municipal service equalization framework, emphasis must be placed on the
geographical and political isolation of minority communities.
This involves supporting complaints with statistical evidence
regarding the socioeconomic demographics of the relevant
communities.2 7 Such evidence should indicate the number of
minorities living in the area in question, patterns of housing
segregation, and the history of these patterns. The evidence
should also indicate concentration of poverty within the region
in question. This will help demonstrate the residents' political
powerlessness. 20 8 The complaint should highlight physical barriers that separate the minority community from the community at large, such as highways, railroad tracks, industrial
buffer zones, and rivers. 20 9 As stated above, presenting the
community in this way makes the deprivation at issue easily
discernable to the reviewing court.210 In addition, the record
should provide statistics regarding minority representation in
relevant political bodies. If such representation is low, it further demonstrates that the community is politically disenfranchised. The overall effect of illustrating the minority community's physical and political isolation is to show that it has been
marginalized on "the other side of the tracks."21' This designation creates an understanding of the community's mistreatment and neglect, to which the courts have previously been receptive.2 12
In addition, these suits should provide historical evidence
of discrimination. Such evidence should target discriminatory
actions on the local level. In municipal service equalization
cases, the courts were particularly responsive to evidence of racially restrictive zoning and housing segregation. 213 The plaintiffs were able to find antiquated municipal ordinances and
206. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 37.
209. Note that the courts in the municipal services cases were particularly
receptive to such physical isolation. See text accompanying supra note 35.
210. See text accompanying supra notes 201, 205-06.
211. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1287 (5th Cir. 1971); see
also supra notes 159-63 (demonstrating the importance of presenting isolated
minority communities to courts in environmental justice claims).
212. See supra Part I.A.
213. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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statutes clearly evincing discriminatory motivations. 2 4 If local
evidence is unavailable, plaintiffs should cast a more national
net, discussing, for example, federally mandated discriminatory
zoning practices used in the early 1900s. During the 1930s and
1940s, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) engaged in
discriminatory lending practices that frequently conditioned on
the presence of racially restrictive covenants.21 ' These actions
effectively subsidized "white-flight" to the suburbs and concentrated minority communities in the central city. 216 Though
national in scope, the effects of the FHA's policies were decidedly local. As such, plaintiffs could reference these actions as
evidence of historical discrimination. By presenting this type of
evidence, plaintiffs can allege that the effect of the deprivation
21
at issue is to 'freeze in' the results of past discrimination." 1
Accordingly, courts will be better positioned to find intent to
discriminate in accordance with the Arlington Heights test.218
Finally, to successfully structure environmental justice
suits like municipal services equalization cases, the complaint
should assert multiple claims for the deprivation of multiple
benefits. Doing so increases the factors the court must consider
under a "totality of the evidence" test. 219 This requires placing
environmental justice concerns alongside substantive municipal services deprivation claims. For example, when contesting
the quality of the water provided to a minority community, the
suit should also challenge the quality of the treatment plants,
the municipality's history of enforcing relevant environmental
statutes, and any other municipal service disparity that may be
documented. Bringing the environmental justice claim with
municipal services claims helps demonstrate the similarities
between these two types of cases, which would not be as apparent if the environmental justice claim were brought in isolation.
214. See Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 986-87 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing various patently discriminatory city ordinances); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363, 1369 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (considering excerpts from the
official minute books of the City of Arcadia that demonstrate overt unresponsiveness of city officials to the needs of minority communities).
215. Kathleen Graham & Colleen Walbran, Racism and Metropolitan Dynamics: The Civil Rights Challenge of the 21st Century, 2002 INST. ON RACE &
POVERTY 9-13.
216. Id.
217. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971).
218. For a description of the Arlington Heights test, see supra note 176.
219. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1983)
(weighing the "totality of the relevant facts") (quoting Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
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B. PROS AND CONS OF STRUCTURING ENVIRONMENTAL SUITS
AFTER THE MUNICIPAL SERVICES CASES

Structuring environmental justice suits in accordance with
the municipal services cases confers several benefits. First,
unlike environmental statutes, it addresses concerns unique to
environmental justice and is not subject to chance failures in
providing the public an adequate comment period.220 In addition, this method avoids the problems witnessed in the
Sandoval and the three
cases by attempting to demon• • •Camden
. 221
strate intent to discriminate. It eschews any attempt to hinge
the case on a chance finding of disparate impact discrimination,
which courts have been reluctant to infer. Finally, analogizing
environmental justice to the municipal services cases places the
environmental justice movement within a historically successful context, allowing it to take advantage of successful precedent.222
The municipal services equalization analogy, however, is
not without its drawbacks. For instance, in establishing an
equal protection violation, a requirement of actual harm
exists. 2222 That is to say, the violation must have already
occurred. 224 This makes it difficult to obtain declaratory relief
enjoining the planned permitting and siting of a polluting facility in a minority community. Finally, due to the novelty of this
proposal, it has not yet been determined how the courts would
respond, although, initial indicators suggest a favorable response.225
220. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 121-48 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 15-42 and accompanying text.
223. Tessa Meyer Santiago, Note, An Ounce of Preemption Is Worth a
Pound of Cure: State Preemption of Local Siting Authority as a Means for
Achieving Environmental Equity, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 112 (2002); see also
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 (1976) (discussing racially discriminatory impact); R.I.S.E. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991) (discussing racially discriminatory impact).
224. See Santiago, supra note 223, at 112.
225. See Miller v. City of Dallas, No. 3: 98-CV-2955-D, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2341, *53 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2002). In this case, the court partially denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment against an environmental
justice action structured as a municipal services case. See id. Specifically, the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant discriminated against its residents with
respect to flood protection, zoning, protection from industrial nuisances, landfill practices, streets and drainage, and federal funding for housing and community development. Id. Such discrimination, the plaintiffs believed,
amounted to a denial of their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
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CONCLUSION
The decisions rendered in Sandoval and Camden III eliminated the possibility of using citizens' suits to enforce the EPA's
disparate impact regulations promulgated under section 602 of
Title VI. With the drop of the gavel, the environmental justice
movement lost its most promising prospect for success. The result: a deflated environmental justice movement again searching for a plausible legal mechanism with which to pursue its
objectives.
A solution to the movement's quandary presents itself
when reexamining its early successes in the municipal services
context. In these cases, minority communities were able to
demonstrate that the inequitable distribution of municipal
benefits constituted an equal protection violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment. By analogizing to these cases, environmental justice plaintiffs can take advantage of successful
precedent and cast Fourteenth Amendment challenges in a new
light. If framed correctly, such suits should provide new life to
environmental justice litigation.

Amendment. Id.

